Chapter Thirty-Three: An Invitation to Churchill

O Pai da França Montanha Verde e Abetos de Ferro 2344 words 2026-08-05 03:27:04

This might require American assistance, as the French Air Force currently lacks the capability to conduct airborne operations. Shortly after facing the failure of Operation Market Garden, Eisenhower received a request from the French side for assistance in a local operation.

The ground offensive force is centered around the French First Army’s 5th Mountain Division, a unit composed of Alawites and Druze from Syria, formerly stationed along the Golan Heights.

Regarding the French-Italian border, deploying twelve divisions is actually quite difficult. The reason the command ultimately settled on twelve divisions for the attack was a lingering belief in the combat effectiveness of the Italian army.

During the Battle of France, the main theater was in the north. However, after France announced its surrender, Italy felt it could take advantage of the situation and dispatched thirty-two divisions across the border to attack southern France. The French had amassed 180,000 defenders, but they were barely utilized. Only 60,000 French troops encountered the Italian offensive forces, yet they successfully held the southeastern defensive line.

At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Eisenhower received the request from the French command and felt completely at a loss. He had just finished his psychological preparation, ready to salvage the reputation of Montgomery—who had failed in Operation Market Garden—and he hadn't even finished drafting the consolatory speech when the French also wanted to conduct an airborne operation?

"Henry!" Eisenhower looked at the French military representative at the headquarters, his face showing a rare sense of helplessness. He usually avoided speaking ill of one country in front of another, but was the timing right? "Operation Market Garden did not fully achieve its strategic objectives."

Eisenhower still chose to save face for Montgomery. Regardless of the strategic goals or the exchange ratio, Operation Market Garden was a defeat, but Eisenhower decided to do some damage control.

"The southern front has been deadlocked for months. The Alps are extremely difficult to break through due to the terrain. Relatively speaking, the French border is somewhat easier; of course, the Yugoslav side at the eastern end is also accessible. Currently, the Yugoslav Communist forces led by Tito are making great progress. If the Allied forces do not take action here, it will have a negative impact on our post-war influence on the Italian Peninsula."

This remark hit the nail on the head regarding Eisenhower's deepest concerns. It must be said that politician-generals have many thoughts, and the U.S. had no shortage of such generals, with Eisenhower being a prime example.

Since the liberation of France, the results of the Western Allied forces had been meager, and they remained blocked outside of Germany. It wasn't that no one wanted to achieve a breakthrough as quickly as possible to prevent the Soviet Red Army from occupying all of Germany; wasn't the recently failed Operation Market Garden an effort in that very direction?

Compared to the Western Front, the offensive of the Soviet Red Army in the East was surging like a tidal wave, displaying an overwhelming momentum. Having just routed Romania and Bulgaria in one fell swoop, they immediately launched an offensive along the Baltic front, while the central Soviet forces marched non-stop into Hungary.

Hungary was Germany's last ally in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Soviet Red Army launched two major campaigns simultaneously demonstrated the sheer power of their military.

Throughout 1944, the Soviet Red Army had pushed the front line westward by nearly 1,000 kilometers, bringing them within striking distance of the German heartland. Based on the time consumed by each of their previous campaigns, they could reach German soil in about two months.

Although the U.S. and the Soviet Union had already finalized a plan for the occupation of Germany, it would be a major problem if the Soviet Red Army occupied all of Germany while the Western Allies remained stagnant.

If Koman knew of Eisenhower's anxiety, he would surely burst out laughing. Eisenhower's worry would persist for at least a few more months. Germany was well aware of what its army had done within Soviet territory and feared the retaliation that would come once the Soviet Red Army entered German soil.

Therefore, in 1945, the remaining German forces were allocated at a ratio of roughly one to four: 700,000 troops defended the Siegfried Line on the Western Front, while nearly 3 million fought tooth and nail against the Soviet Red Army on the Eastern Front.

Yet even so, by February 1945, the Western Allied forces remained outside the German border, unable to make headway against the 700,000 German troops on the Western Front.

With one front surging with momentum and the other standing still, and watching their future imaginary enemy grow stronger with every battle, the Western Allies were understandably unsettled.

As for the Italian front in the south, it was indeed the weakest in terms of defensive strength; even a small amount of progress would be welcome. The Allied forces, having just failed in Operation Market Garden, certainly needed to produce some results.

"When the First Army returned to southern France, I knew a day like this would come," Eisenhower thought after weighing the pros and cons. Since the French were willing to contribute, and the combat effectiveness of the German-Italian coalition on the Italian front was relatively low, it was worth a try.

Although most of the French First Army had been withdrawn from Italy, due to reinforcements from the British, Americans, and other participating nations, the Allied forces in Italy were twice the strength of the German-Italian coalition, holding a clear numerical advantage.

The rugged terrain of northern Italy was admittedly unfavorable for an offensive, but it also checked the mobility of German armored units. The battle would primarily be an infantry engagement in the mountains, which might actually work in the Allies' favor.

The operational plan proposed by the French was quite broad in scope, but its core was the occupation of the Aosta Valley, a French-speaking region. If things went more smoothly, who would complain about occupying more territory? However, the strategic goal of the operation could be set higher, such as routing the German 14th Army, which would serve to mask the true strategic objective.

This could also be seen as a rehearsal for a future offensive into the Saar region. Although the terrain there was unfavorable, if France couldn't even take Italy, the prospects of occupying the Saar would be even more difficult.

Later that day, the French command received approval for the operational plan from the Allied Supreme Headquarters, along with a response promising coordination regarding the battlefield situation in Italy.

"Georges, represent the Provisional Government in inviting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to visit Paris." De Gaulle was the first leader to learn of Eisenhower's support for the southern front offensive plan.

Now that Operation Market Garden had just failed, France's immediate proposal for an offensive on the southern front might displease the British. Inviting Churchill and Eden to Paris was also a move to solidify Anglo-French relations during this special period, especially since, in the eyes of some, the Free French movement itself was backed by the British.

As the head of foreign affairs for the Provisional Government and a representative of the center-right faction supporting De Gaulle, Georges Bidault was duty-bound to issue the invitation on behalf of the government.

He also knew that France had not yet returned to its pre-war level. Although the French army had begun integrating the armed forces of the French Communist Party and had started conscripting new troops to rebuild the Third and Fourth Armies, this would take time.

De Gaulle's invitation for the British wartime leaders to visit Paris was quickly delivered to 10 Downing Street. Prime Minister Churchill immediately convened a cabinet meeting to discuss it. Foreign Secretary Eden expressed his support for the visit, as did Cabinet Secretary Edward Bridges, representing Whitehall.